

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

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DISPATCH NO. *MEKA 100-0220*

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Karlsruhe
FROM : Chief, Foreign Branch II
SUBJECT: GENERAL Operational Hand - Publics
SPECIFIC: Zipper and Bonn

DATE: 19 September 1966

1. After reading Full 1037, our only constructive suggestion is that someone should put a cold towel on Utility's head. His reaction to the official announcement of Cafield's appointment gives eloquent support to the various appraisals of his character which have been written by the FBI staff.

2. As nearly as we can analyze it, Utility seems to feel that by some divine ordinance nothing should happen in the military or security fields in West Germany without either his concurrence or his direct participation. This peculiar proclivity, particularly well outlined in Full 1036, is rapidly creating a most insoluble problem for us. On the one hand we would like to maintain Zipper as an intelligence asset for the U.S. government. Along this same line, we want to see individuals of the same variety properly placed in any German re-militarization effort simply on the grounds of motivation, capacity, and orientation toward the American viewpoint. On the other hand, we have Utility attempting to use in favor the influence of his organization, not as an intelligence asset, but as a political grouping of former German officers.

3. We hardly know how to suggest that you unravel this circular skein, but we do share with you a basic concern over what it is we are attempting to advocate with McCloy and DeGruyter. We certainly go along with paragraph six of Full 1034 just as we do with paragraphs three, four and five of Karl 9769. But as we indicated in Full 14044, there is a legitimate distinction between Zipper as an intelligence package and the use of certain Zipperites on an individual basis in the re-militarization effort. Too, this distinction would not be difficult to work out if it were not for Utility's

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Richard Helms

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personal ambition and desire to be the only "true prophet". It can be fairly said that a certain portion of Zipper is of little value to anyone except to Utility and his political aspirations. Therefore, would it not be feasible to suggest that we treat Zipper as an apolitical intelligence organization which deserves some support and localization, thus enabling us to back off from the advocacy of specific members of Zipper in their campaigns for political or military jobs? Stated another way, McCloy should discuss Zipper with ~~Utility~~ as an organization and not get into individual personalities. This would then leave him free to advocate in Allied councils specific German officers, whether Zipper or not, for any jobs he deemed best. In this fashion we could make our influence in individual cases felt through him without each time raising the question of whether or not the person wears the Zipper badge.

4. Possibly the foregoing suggestion lacks realism, but we have got to attempt to make some sort of distinction. Otherwise we will find ourselves bogged down in the ring-around-a-rosey which is bound to continue until there is enough German remilitarization to provide jobs for all interested officers. Also this approach should help us in outmaneuvering the British and French on specific candidates for key posts whereas it is pretty hard to stand behind the scenes and pull strings with the large Zipper organization bulging out on every side and constantly giving our game away.

5. Frankly, on individual cases such as Horn, possibly Speidel, Foertsch and others, we should not hesitate to request Shute to use his influence to see them well placed. American officials, both diplomatic and military, generally bend over backward to avoid interfering in the internal affairs of any country even an occupied one. Consequently they often find themselves outmaneuvered by the British and French who are much less conscience stricken at the use of pressures and under-the-table politicking. For this reason we as an organization should at least make our intelligence needs strongly felt with Shute, and through him with McCloy and Mays, to see to it that a reasonable number of "safe" officers land in top jobs in any remilitarization effort. We would need such individuals regardless of the fate of Zipper.

6. I thought you might be interested in the attached clippings of newspaper articles on the rearming of West Germany.

Attachment

Richard Helms

AS ATTACHMENT FOR FILE.
A.Y.

E X T R A C T

FROM: MGKA-23504, 20 October 1950, Subj: Weekly Letter from []

6. I visited PCB on the morning of the 11th. [] described a long and bitter conference he had had with UTILITY some days after the McCloy dinner. During the conference [] took the position outlined in your MGKW 6425 and achieved good results. UTILITY, it appears, was practically isolated within his own organization in the matter of the McCloy dinner. All of his senior people were against it, and apparently he had had a bitter showdown with them prior to his meeting with []. Thus [] was in a position to deal the final blow.

[] and I decided that we would not return to the subject of the meeting on the occasion of my visit, but rather ask UTILITY to brief me for my discussions in Washington. The meeting was laid on as a final one before my return home. The discussion was cordial, and I must say not very revealing.

I will arrange another meeting with UTILITY before leaving the Theater, at which time I will express to him your view about the McCloy dinner.

MWC-000780